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METHODOLOGY Open Access
Application of Incident Command Structure
to clinical trial management in the
academic setting: principles and lessons
learned
Penny S. Reynolds1,2*, Mary J. Michael1,2 and Bruce D. Spiess1,2
Abstract
Background: Clinical trial success depends on appropriate management, but practical guidance to trial organisation
and planning is lacking. The Incident Command System (ICS) is the ‘gold standard’ management system developed for
managing diverse operations in major incident and public health arenas. It enables effective and flexible management
through integration of personnel, procedures, resources, and communications within a common hierarchical
organisational structure. Conventional ICS organisation consists of five function modules: Command, Planning,
Operations, Logistics, and Finance/Administration. Large clinical trials will require a separate Regulatory Administrative
arm, and an Information arm, consisting of dedicated data management and information technology staff. We applied
ICS principles to organisation and management of the Prehospital Use of Plasma in Traumatic Haemorrhage (PUPTH)
trial. This trial was a multidepartmental, multiagency, randomised clinical trial investigating prehospital administration
of thawed plasma on mortality and coagulation response in severely injured trauma patients.
We describe the ICS system as it would apply to large clinical trials in general, and the benefits, barriers, and lessons
learned in utilising ICS principles to reorganise and coordinate the PUPTH trial.
Results: Without a formal trial management structure, early stages of the trial were characterised by inertia and
organisational confusion. Implementing ICS improved organisation, coordination, and communication between
multiple agencies and service groups, and greatly streamlined regulatory compliance administration. However,
unfamiliarity of clinicians with ICS culture, conflicting resource allocation priorities, and communication bottlenecks
were significant barriers.
Conclusions: ICS is a flexible and powerful organisational tool for managing large complex clinical trials. However, for
successful implementation the cultural, psychological, and social environment of trial participants must be accounted
for, and personnel need to be educated in the basics of ICS.
Trial registration: ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT02303964. Registered on 28 November 2014.
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Background
Clinical trials are essential to evidence-based medicine,
but failure rates can be high [1, 2]. Failed trials result in
both substantial cost burdens and risk to patients
without evidence of benefit. Lack of trial success may re-
sult from product failure (that is, inability of the test
intervention to demonstrate either clinical benefit or an
acceptable safety profile), but poor management may
also be a contributing factor. Although hard data on the
specifics of trial management failures are difficult to
come by [3, 4], there is no reason to believe that clinical
trials are exempt from the management problems found
in other sectors. For example, it has been estimated that
more than 75% of information technology (IT) projects
fail, with over 30% cancelled before completion, and
more than 50% with significant cost over-runs. Manage-
ment inadequacies account for the bulk of failures.
Specific management problems include inadequate pro-
ject organisation and planning, inadequate leadership
and governance, overly optimistic projections of project
feasibility, inappropriate and inadequate research team
skills and competency, and ineffective communication
between invested parties [5].
Effective management of all features of a trial should
increase the chances of successful trial completion [6, 7].
However, although there is extensive documentation on
regulatory aspects of running clinical trials [4, 8], few
practical guidelines deal explicitly with the project
management side [7]. Commonly, trials are organised on
a committee basis (Fig. 1). In this model, team units
consist of a steering committee, involving the lead or
principal investigator (PI) and other coinvestigators who
share the overall responsibility for the trial; a safety adju-
dication committee of physicians to review safety and
protocol compliance; an independent Data Safety
Monitoring Board (DSMB); and a methods committee,
which has oversight for day-to-day operations. Personnel
consist of physicians, research coordinators, research
nurses, administrators, trial-specific staff, and one or
more biostatisticians [9]. Because the lead investigator is
directly involved with all aspects of trial operations with
few or no intermediate levels of organisation, this is
essentially a ‘flat land’ management structure [10].
Flat land management has significant disadvantages.
As the legally responsible entity for the trial, the lead
investigator is implicitly assumed to understand and be
involved with most, if not all, aspects of trial manage-
ment. These include a diverse array of tasks, including
scientific and grant development, trial planning, budget
and resource allocation, trial design, trial logistics,
project and personnel management, and accountability
for all required regulatory mandates [11]. However,
academic lead investigators must juggle many other
responsibilities related to their primary job [12, 13], and
may get little protected time away from clinical responsi-
bilities. Many tasks, especially those pertaining to
budgeting and regulatory compliance, are highly complex
and may be nearly invisible to the lead investigator, who
will not have the necessary training, expertise, or time for
adequate oversight. As a result, most trial-related activities
are delegated to a trial coordinator (TC), with the expect-
ation that this person will somehow ‘make it all work’.
Proficiency requirements for certified Clinical Research
Coordinators (CCRCs) now include over 100 tasks in five
domains (investigational product management, protocol
development, safety, regulatory issues, and trial manage-
ment) and approximately 20 subject areas [14]. Neverthe-
less, although these individuals might have the expertise
to direct the overall operational aspects of a clinical trial,
they cannot be expected to have the additional scientific
background, financial and business acumen, and in-depth
knowledge required to manage all tasks required for a
particular study. In a large trial, leadership can be easily
overwhelmed by the amount of unfiltered information to
be processed and the number of low-level decisions to be
made [10]. Consequences include unrealistic expectations
as to what the trial can accomplish, ineffective planning,
poor integration of evolving trial requirements into the
management structure, poor decision-making, poor
communication, inefficient delegation of responsibilities
and workloads, lack of accountability, confusion, and
squandered personnel and financial resources.
The ‘gold standard’ for managing complex operations
in the major incident and public health arenas is the
Incident Command System (ICS). We used it to
reorganise and manage a large, multigency, multidepart-
mental clinical trial, the Prehospital Use of Plasma in
Traumatic Haemorrhage (PUPTH) trial [15]. This article
describes the fundamentals of the ICS, and our ex-
perience and lessons learned in implementing this
model to coordinate the diverse agencies, clinical
departments, personnel, and tasks required to launch
the PUPTH trial.
Fig. 1 Conventional clinical trial management architecture (adapted
from [9]). This is ‘flat land’ management [10], as the lead investigator
is directly involved with all aspects of trial management. Although
communication chains are short, the lead investigator can be easily
overwhelmed by information and low-level decision-making
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Methods
The Incident Command System (ICS) is a systematic
tool used for the command, control, and coordination of
emergency response-requiring direction and synchron-
isation among several groups, agencies, or organisations.
It is a hierarchical organisational structure that clearly
depicts lines of authority, functional roles and responsi-
bilities, and communication networks [16]. ICS was first
developed in the 1970s by wildland fire services in
California and Arizona, and has since been modified and
adapted for use during local incidents such as major
traffic accidents [17], hospital surge response [18],
planned mass events (such as the Vancouver 2010
Olympics [19]), and epidemic disease outbreaks [20–22].
ICS is characterised by modular organisation and
coordination of functional groups, rather than direct
management by the lead investigator of individual assets
or personnel. ICS modular organisation determines a
manageable span of control that results in increased
efficiency, flexibility, and above all, accountability. In the
early stages of project planning, or for very small trials,
initial management of the most important activities can
be the responsibility of a few people. As the trial
increases in size and complexity, personnel can be
assigned to functional units as needed, and according to
their expertise and skillsets. Roles can be discontinued
when no longer required, and personnel reassigned to
different positions (‘role switching’) within the trial [23].
Each supervisory level is managed by a liaison, who
reports directly to the designated project leader and is
responsible for managing the appropriate number of
tasks and personnel compatible with maintaining effect-
ive oversight and communication. Teams are small,
cross-functional, self-directed, and able to establish team
goals and assess progress. The lead investigator, although
ultimately responsible for all aspects of trial conduct,
takes only those actions that cannot be made by liaisons
reporting directly to the project lead. As a result, the or-
ganisational structure is never larger than required, but
is sufficient to maintain a reasonable span of control and
efficiency, and accomplish the required tasks without
spreading personnel too thin.
The standard ICS model consists of five functional
modules: Command, Planning, Operations, Logistics, and
Finance Administration [24]. To streamline clinical trial
organisation, the basic ICS structure can be modified to
include additional Regulatory Administration and Infor-
mation arms (Fig. 2).
Command
Command staff includes the lead/principal investigator,
trial coordinator/project manager, steering committee,
safety oversight officer, and public relations officer.
The lead investigator is legally responsible for trial
oversight. For larger trials, general management tasks
(clinical research coordination and trial management,
safety, and public relations) are delegated to Command
staff, which includes the TC and one or more assistants.
However, effective oversight and involvement of the lead
investigator and TCs cannot be achieved by delegation
alone unless adequate oversight and monitoring mecha-
nisms are in place [25, 26]. These mechanisms involve
the provision of regularly updated and consistent infor-
mation on trial operational status. To prevent the lead
investigator and TC from being overwhelmed by detail,
management staff must function as a united team,
coordinating plans and actions across the trial, and
exchanging timely, accurate, and consistent information
with all study personnel. Delegation of authority, and
roles and responsibilities of all key personnel must be
clearly defined. To maintain continuity and ensure legal
compliance, alternates must be designated in case of
prolonged absence, illness, or turnover of key personnel.
For industry-sponsored trials, study oversight is provided
by an independent academic steering committee. The
steering committee is composed of academic investiga-
tors, and should have authority over critical decisions
related to trial conduct, data collection and manage-
ment, reporting of results, and safety monitoring and
oversight. An outside biostatistician should have
independent access to the raw data and be able to con-
duct data analyses independent of the sponsor [27].
Safety oversight is usually provided by one or more
physicians responsible for monitoring subject accrual,
compliance with enrolment and eligibility criteria, and
adverse events. The trial safety officer liaises directly
with the Data Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB), the
members of which are not associated with the trial, and
work independently of the lead investigator. The
purpose of the DSMB is to provide arm’s-length inde-
pendent oversight of the safety of trial patients, and to
monitor overall trial conduct; at least one member
should be an independent biostatistician [28]. Formalised
standardised templates for DSMB management and
responsibilities are available (e.g. https://humansub-
jects.nih.gov/data_safety; [29].
Public Relations and Communications involve the
development, integration, and management of effective
communication between the research entities and the
public. Effective public relations (PR) are essential to the
recruitment and enrolment effort for clinical trials. They
also fulfil an important informational role in public
education as to the purpose and benefits of the proposed
trial. In the academic setting this responsibility is
generally undertaken by an institutional office of
communications and public relations. However, a study-
specific strategic communications plan may be required,
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especially if the research is controversial or subject to
misperception. Community notification and consult-
ation meetings will be required when research is
conducted under Exception to Informed Consent. A
PR officer may be designated for communicating with
the institutional PR officer and other trial stake-
holders. An information dissemination plan should be
put in place early in the trial so that essential activ-
ities can be identified and budgeted; these include
crisis management, community notification meetings,
and initiation and updating of relevant web sites,
including clinical trial registration [30].
Liaisons
Liaisons interact between Command staff and other
operational groups. Each liaison is responsible for a spe-
cific operational group, which in turn manages specific
assignments. Liaisons should have the autonomy to
select team members to achieve the tasks delegated to
that functional group. They are, therefore, accountable
Fig. 2 Incident Command Structure as applied to clinical trial management. Advantages are more manageable span of control, more effective
coordination of diverse tasks, and more effective allocation of tasks and functions to teams with specific expertise and oversight skills
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for completion of those tasks, and providing group
activity reports required for regulatory documentation;
these activity reports are also means of tracking
personnel effort for fiscal accounting and project
reimbursement. Expectations for each liaison and
operational group must be clearly communicated, and
strategies for achieving liaison buy-in and accountability
must be in place.
Planning
Planning is the process of defining strategies, strategic
priorities, major tactics, and the coordination of all
support activities to accomplish the objectives of the clin-
ical trial. The Planning section supports the Command
and Operations sections through the processing of infor-
mation relevant to trial status, developing and updating
action plans, providing recommendations and directives,
and supplying all pertinent documentation. In addition to
planning of the trial proper, planning activities will also
include pretrial feasibility planning, long-range planning,
contingency planning, and analysis planning.
Feasibility planning should be a realistic assessment
of the capacity of the research team to successfully
execute the proposed trial. It should be the first step
in trial planning, and should be completed well before
the proposed trial initiation date [31]. Almost one
third of trials fail because no subjects could be
enrolled, and 80 to 90% of trials do not meet enrol-
ment timelines [12]. Thus, the feasibility plan should
provide verifiable and accurate forecasts of subject
availability and recruitment rates, preferably based on
relevant historical or epidemiological site data. Other
measures of feasibility include success of prior trials
and trial partnerships; realistic assessment of
personnel, staffing, and resource capacity; and an esti-
mate of likely budget requirements [32, 33].
Long-range planning forecasts anticipated resource
needs (e.g. supplies, personnel, staffing) and subject
recruitment projections. Identification of specific needs
requires close collaboration with, and feedback from,
each of the relevant service groups involved in the trial.
Contingency plans should be developed to anticipate
unexpected and disruptive changes in the trial and
identify alternative courses of action. In any trial the
chances of something going wrong is virtually 100%.
Contingency planning involves the identification of
potential risks for each functional area and the negative
consequences of each, prioritisation of those risks, and
development of backup plans to minimise disruption of
the trial should one or more of these events occur.
Likely risks include lower than expected subject recruit-
ment rates, lower than expected event rates, significant
adverse events, loss or absence of key personnel, data
loss, and data security breaches.
Analysis planning includes issues pertaining to study
experimental design (including randomisation and blind-
ing), study sample size estimation, choice of statistical
models, interim analyses [33], methods used to estimate
treatment effects, and criteria determining clinical
importance (as opposed to statistical significance) [34].
It will require the participation of one or more
professional statisticians.
All stakeholder personnel (including service groups)
should be regarded as active collaborators with a vested
interest in the research, rather than mere consultants
(or, as in one investigator’s appalling phrase, ‘blue-collar
workers’). Detailed planning and specific tactics will be
determined by each of the relevant service groups
involved in the trial. Personnel investment in the trial
(‘buy-in’) is improved and maintained by clear commu-
nication of expectations, regular updates of trial status,
determining the appropriate skillsets required for
specific jobs, provision of timely and adequate support
so that personnel can do their job, and showing active
appreciation and reward. Expectations for coauthorship
and financial remuneration must be clarified and
discussed early.
To ensure agreement and common purpose in all
members of the planning team and to avoid mission
creep, the objectives, purpose, and scope of the trial
should be clearly identified at the very beginning. The
primary and secondary outcome variables to be
measured (what) are identified, prioritised, and endorsed
by the team. After that, the how and who need to be
identified: the methods and resources required to collect,
disseminate, analyse, and secure relevant information,
and the specific people identified with the requisite skills
who can do the work. Open communication between all
stakeholders is a priority, especially with key service
groups responsible for data collection and management.
Information must be timely, accurate, and useful, other-
wise personnel are forced to work in a vacuum. As a
result, the planning committee should include represen-
tatives from all key functional areas and technical
specialties, and not be restricted to coinvestigators and
physicians, as is generally the case.
The planning process
The common elements to the overall trial plan include a
clear statement of goals and objectives, clearly defined
success metrics (how will you know the intervention or
process ‘works’?), a defined time frame and time periods
for all operations, process and procedure flow maps,
identification of key personnel to be in charge and the
reporting process to be followed, a preliminary resource
list (to be further refined by input from liaisons for each
functional area and service group), and methods to
document the planning process. Identification and
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correction of operational inefficiencies or gaps must be
performed in collaboration with other functional groups,
especially Operations and Logistics. A clear statement of
goals and objectives is necessary to ensure agreement
and common purpose in all members of the planning
team and to avoid mission creep. The primary and
secondary outcome variables to be measured (what) are
identified and prioritised. After that, the how and who
need to be identified: the methods and resources
required to collect, disseminate, analyse, and secure
relevant information, and the specific people with the
requisite skills who can do the work.
The plan requires process flow maps. These maps are a
schematic timeline of each of the required tasks or activ-
ities in the order in which they need to be accomplished
(Fig. 3). The sequence shows both task dependencies
(what tasks need to be accomplished before another
given task), and functional dependencies (when tasks or
processes cross functional boundaries, such as a different
database or service department required to obtain or
process data) [35]. Process mapping facilitates the
identification of personnel groups required to perform a
given activity, immediate needs (including missing or re-
dundant tasks), points of workflow interactions, points of
documentation, permissions to be obtained, and databases
utilised. The flow map can be supplemented as needed
with estimates of time taken to complete each step,
resources, and costs [36, 37]. Several task maps may be
required; for example, a general trial flow map, a map of
patient or subject flow through the system, and critical
data acquisition and collection points (Fig. 3). Additional
process maps can be created for the oversight review and
approval process, contracts and budgeting, and final prep-
aration (e.g. site preparation, sponsor site visits, study drug
or device acquisition and shipping) [35].
Because plans are to be communicated to everyone in-
volved in the trial, they should be simple, concise, and
clearly written. The amount of detail in the general plan
should be sufficient for a clear understanding of trial
goals and overall feasibility. All personnel must be
informed as to their roles and responsibilities related to
a plan, and provision made for the necessary training.
Fig. 3 Generalised task flow maps for the PUPTH trial. Integration of Patient Flow with Information Flow maps was crucial for identifying barriers to
data collection; blood samples (non-standard information) had to be collected at predesignated time points; however, patient location in the hospital
care chain at those times could not be predicted in advance
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Whenever practical, ‘boots on the ground’ rehearsals or
drills should be conducted to identify weaknesses and
problems, and begin corrective action. Plans must be
reviewed on a regular basis, especially if there are major
changes in personnel, operations, and technology.
Specific milestones or targets must be set to measure
progress, identify specific personnel designated with the
responsibility for accomplishing each task, and an estab-
lished method for reporting established. People with
both leadership authority and a genuine interest in
having the project succeed should be assigned to
mission-critical tasks.
Information
The true deliverable of a clinical trial is information that
is accurate, reliable, and secure. Therefore, it is essential
that a dedicated data management and IT team is
involved in the early stages of clinical trial planning,
both to avoid mission creep and ensure appropriate
alignment of data collection requirements with study
objectives. The activities involved in information man-
agement are diverse, consisting of variable identification
and coding, data collection, data collation, matching of
diverse databases, transfer, archiving, analyses, documen-
tation, access, quality control, and security. Permissions
and handling of sensitive information are integral to the
process. Biostatisticians will need to collaborate with IT
and data management groups to identify and work
through data management issues. Sufficient planning
time must be allocated to determine the most appropri-
ate experimental design, sample sizes, and analytical
methods for the study. These require an adequate under-
standing by all parties of the scientific question, and the
form and origin of the data. Extraneous or ‘non-goal’
trial data (data not associated with primary or key
secondary endpoints, regulatory compliance, or standard
baseline assessments) result from a loss of focus, and
contribute to increased trial costs, while diluting trial
effectiveness [38].
There are three main information streams: trial-specific
information, planning information, and auxiliary informa-
tion. Trial-specific information consists of data on patient
demographics and primary and secondary outcomes. Data
are obtained from standard medical records (as part of the
documentation of patient care), and/or from non-
standard sources. Non-standard data are required meet
the objectives of the study, but are not part of routine
medical care (for example, blood samples used to identify
novel biomarkers). Planning information is used for in-
ternal planning and contingency discussions designed to
address trends, associations, problems, milestone assess-
ments, or other issues indicated by the metrics, and en-
ables appropriate corrective action to be made in a timely
way. Planning information relies on the collection of
benchmark metrics – easily measured, readily available,
relevant data related to study implementation and trial
conduct (rather than patient outcomes). Predetermined
and clearly defined metrics permit major decisions to be
made with reference to hard data, rather than by intuition,
prior experience, or HiPPO (Highest Paid Person’s Opin-
ion) syndrome [39]1. Performance metrics include time
taken to complete the critical steps of all major processes
or tasks, number of errors (such as missing data, out of
bounds data entries, protocol deviations), patient enrol-
ment numbers, number of eligible patients, number of
missed enrolments, protocol deviations, expenditures and
costs, and capacity gaps (resources required versus re-
sources supplied).
Auxiliary information relates to all background and
supplementary information pertaining to the trial. Both
systematic and rapid reviews are increasingly recognised
as an essential part of the planning process for new
clinical trials [40, 41]. A synthesis of all relevant
evidence is necessary to ensure that the proposed
research avoids unnecessary duplication, addresses rele-
vant deficiencies in previous work, and minimises
research waste [42]. Professional librarians are informa-
tion specialists, and can assist with literature searching,
citation management, and evidence appraisal.
Operations
The goal of appropriate operational management is to
make the trial ‘work’; that is, to fulfil the strategic goals
and objectives of the trial. Operations consist of all the
tasks and resources required for trial start-up, imple-
mentation, monitoring, and management. These are
facilitated by development of written standard operating
procedures (SOPs).
SOPs are brief (one to two-page) written guidelines
that define how operations are to be conducted, and
expectations and requirements for all personnel when
performing their job [43, 44]. Personnel working in
different departments or functional groups often work in
virtual silos and are unfamiliar with the requirements,
organisation, and functional response of other groups.
SOPs are, therefore, indispensable for familiarising
personnel with trial procedures, ensuring compliance
with regulatory requirements, minimising protocol
deviations or violations, information sharing and coord-
inating effort across the trial, and identifying structural
barriers that result from working across administrative
divisions. SOPs that are applicable to institutional
procedures may already be in place. In the US, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) mandates documented
SOPs specifically for data collection and handling in
FDA-oversight trials, and these SOPs are subject to
federal audit.
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SOPs should be uniformly structured and consist of a
formal statement of objectives, list of responsible
personnel, a line-item list of procedures, and a list of
definitions for all major regulatory terms and acronyms
used [44–46]. Relevant guidelines and regulations should
be referenced as applicable (e.g. ICH E6 Good Clinical
Practice, 21 CFR 50; Exception from Informed Consent
Requirement, 21 CFR 50.24). SOPs should be signed and
dated by the responsible agent for the functional group,
administrator, or director. All SOPs should be reviewed
at regular intervals, and revised as necessary to ensure
applicability to the trial [44–46].
The liaisons for each functional or service group are
responsible for assessing operational gaps, instituting
appropriate corrective action, and reporting to the plan-
ning committee in a timely way. This information will
also be required for regulatory documentation. Gaps can
be assessed using a standardised methodology such as
POETE: Planning, Organisation, Equipment, Training,
Evaluation [46].
Logistics
Logistics refer to the management of all support activ-
ities to maintain the operational function of the clinical
trial: equipment and supplies, movement of resources
and personnel, processing of data, subjects, and staff,
and technical services. Other support activities may
include communication capabilities with other func-
tional areas, service groups and relevant personnel;
resource tracking; and personnel accountability. Logistic
liaisons will interact with the finance sector for prepar-
ation of service and equipment contracts, and with the
administration sector to ensure that personnel have on
file all required regulatory compliance documentation,
training certifications, and licensure requirements.
Logistics personnel will also be involved with practical
aspects of subject source identification and availability,
determination as to feasibility of a single-centre versus
multicentre trial, between-centre liaison strategies, deci-
sions on treatment and control interventions, and
subject follow-up strategies [47].
IT logistics can be especially challenging. Before trial
launch, comprehensive policies should be in place for
identification of sensitive information and rules for data
sharing. Software compatibility between functional
groups, and personnel training, familiarity, and comfort
with software tools must be considered. Protocols for
software tool use should be established, and full use of
tools rehearsed.
Frequently, grant applications are approved before all
resources can be identified, and problems will become
apparent only when the trial is close to, or even fully,
operational. Thus, frequent status evaluations, updates,
and process improvement implementation will be
required, especially in the immediate implementation
phase after trial start-up.
Regulatory administration
Regulatory requirements contribute substantially to the
costs and administrative burden of most trials [32]. Over
the past few decades, protocols have become increas-
ingly complex in both scope and oversight requirements,
as the intent of the protocol has evolved from an over-
view of trial operations to a legal document requiring
strict adherence. Consequently, staffing, staff responsibil-
ities, and workload have also increased.
The success of a large clinical trial depends on orga-
nised, detail-oriented, experienced, and ethical research
staff. The lead investigator must ensure that personnel
are qualified by education, training, and experience (and
licensure where relevant) to perform the delegated tasks.
In general, the TC, a designated study nurse, or regula-
tory specialist, will be the primary manager of regulatory
compliance tasks. However, two or more dedicated
personnel may be required, depending on the amount
and complexity of the workload and the size of the trial.
Ensuring that staffing is sufficient for the workload is
critical, as regulatory specialists may be responsible for
anywhere up to six protocols at a time, all at different
stages of management and implementation [32]. If the
regulations are unclear or are questionable, the lead
investigator and regulatory delegates are responsible for
their clarification. All personnel involved in the trial
must understand that they are responsible for communi-
cating queries and areas of concern before taking action
on their own. Lack of clarity is not synonymous with
permission to make assumptions based on what is most
convenient. The result of leaving actions to individual
interpretation and assumption is non-compliance and a
failure of the trial to protect and value research subjects.
Finance
In the academic setting there is usually a specific adminis-
trative office that oversees the financial management of
large grants. However, at least one dedicated person ‘on
the ground’ should be employed to track costs, account
for reimbursements, and perform billing audits. This is
essential in cross-agency or cross-departmental studies
involving separate administration of multiple subaccounts.
Cost over-runs and cash shortfalls are common in trial
operations. Both sponsors and academic investigators
frequently underestimate the true work effort, and there-
fore costs, involved in trial start-up and task perform-
ance. Sponsors often justify reimbursement rates in
terms of industry benchmark services and procedure
costs, and thus may significantly underestimate the
actual personnel time and project costs in a non-
industry setting. Procedural costs and billing may not be
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standardised across all centres or protocols in a multi-
centre trial. Various key personnel or groups may
negotiate for additional payments out of the trial funding
pool, without clear understanding of the overall budget
allocations. If billing and payments are made on an
installment basis, significant lags between payments may
occur, making accounting difficult. Developing a reason-
able reimbursement schedule requires as much specific
information on time and effort as possible before the
study is initiated. This will require collaboration with all
functional groups and service areas, as information will
be required for all line items and ancillary activities such
as training time.
Results
The Prehospital Use of Plasma in Traumatic Haemor-
rhage (PUPTH) trial was an investigator-initiated, pro-
spective randomised clinical trial to determine the effect
of prehospital administration of thawed blood plasma on
mortality and coagulation response in severely injured
trauma patients [15]. During the start-up phase of this
trial, there was considerable pressure to get the trial
launched quickly without ‘waste’ of time. Early planning
was performed by trial coinvestigators, almost all of
whom were clinicians. Without a management infra-
structure or clear lines of accountability in place,
planning tended to be haphazard, with no clear under-
standing of tasks or responsibility for task completion.
Consequently, the first phase of the trial was charac-
terised by confusion, delays and stagnation. In the
second year the trial was reorganised along an ICS for-
mat (Fig. 4). The revised core management and planning
team consisted of a dedicated TC, a logistics officer, an
additional regulatory officer, and several experts in
clinical data management and IT.
Benefits
Comparison of the first and second years of the PUPTH
trial made clear that ICS had several advantages:
1. The ICS organisational structure clearly identified
chains of command, identified responsible
personnel and task units, made for more effective
allocation and monitoring of tasks, and improved
accountability.
2. Targeting the expertise of relevant personnel in
specific service groups improved management of
limited resources and budget.
Fig. 4 Incident Command Structure as applied to management of the PUPTH trial. This schematic clearly identified chains of command, responsible
personnel, and task and service units. It made for more effective allocation and monitoring of tasks, simplified coordination and coverage of essential
service personnel, and improved accountability
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3. Task flow mapping facilitated coordination and
coverage of essential service personnel (such as the
transport and processing of blood samples).
4. ICS and sectional task flow mapping provided rapid
identification and correction of areas of inertia, and
waste, and allowed prompt identification of
operational bottlenecks. Requests for corrective
action could be targeted to the appropriate
responsible parties.
5. ICS was particularly helpful for organising,
coordinating, and streamlining the enormous
workload involved with regulatory compliance.
Instead of a single TC having the sole responsibility
for meeting all compliance requirements, as is
usual in clinical trials, the workload could be
distributed more evenly over relevant personnel
across the system.
Barriers
The main barriers to effective ICS implementation were
lack of acceptance of ICS-based organisation, lack of
shared goals, priority conflicts, and communication
bottlenecks:
1. Unfamiliarity with ICS culture. The PUPTH trial
was the first time this research group formally
implemented ICS in the management of a clinical
trial. All personnel in both emergency medical
service (EMS) agencies and several individuals on
the planning team were familiar with the ICS
system. However, unlike the fire-fighting and EMS
agencies, clinical departments tend to be self-contained
cultures, and physicians were unaccustomed to
coordinating efforts across departments within a
larger ICS structure. The lead investigator was
clearly recognised as the final arbiter. However,
clinical personnel unused to working within an
ICS did not always recognise the authority of the
TC and steering committee, and ignored routine
communications. Clinicians often found it difficult
to adjust to the concept that personnel in the ICS
hierarchy were identified with specific roles to
support trial organisational structure and needs,
rather than by individual status or affiliation.
Misunderstandings resulted from clinicians preferring
to maintain existing comfort levels and ‘business as
usual’. As a result, they either could not be relied on
to fulfil designated responsibilities without oversight,
or alternatively, took action on their own, circumventing
procedures established to promote cross-organisational
communication (‘free-lancing’ [23])
2. Lack of shared goals. A second barrier was the lack
of a clearly defined ‘shared-value system’ that was
understood and accepted by all trial participants
[23]. The majority of individuals had the success of the
trial as a priority, and were strongly motivated to make
all aspects of the trial work. However, less-committed
individuals or groups showed little initiative, required
frequent follow-up and reminders to complete tasks,
or perceived the role flexibility inherent to ICS
organisation as a threat. This seriously impeded
the day-to-day functioning of the trial
3. Priority conflicts. Demands of a clinical trial
inevitably will be lower priority if they conflict with
standard operations. Conflicts over resource and
priority allocation resulted because of difficulties in
meeting the demands of the trial simultaneously
with the day-to-day operational requirements of the
hospital and outside agencies. In the PUPTH trial,
this was apparent in difficulties inherent in the
management and distribution of thawed plasma,
and resulting demands placed upon both prehospital
personnel and the institutional blood bank
4. Communication bottlenecks were a persistent
problem. Although the appropriate liaisons and
alternatives had been designated early, key groups
did not always notify the planning committee when
personnel changes occurred. ‘Stove-piping’, poor
motivation, and unexpressed lack of support for the
trial on the part of some key personnel and groups
contributed to avoidance of communications.
Alternatively, triangulation, or over-involvement of
the TC and lead investigator, occurred during disputes
or problems occurring between groups, rather than
initial problem resolution occurring between liaisons
Discussion
We summarise six specific lessons learned from this trial
as follows:
1. Clearly identified tasks and task flow maps are the
first organisational priority. This involves identifying
and prioritising those variables needed to satisfy the
specific aims of the trial. Multiple task flow maps
[36, 37] can then be generated to identify key
data providers, service groups, and major data
collection points. This will simplify identification
of personnel and service groups to be included
in the trial
2. Familiarise all personnel early with ICS structure
and chains of command. Establishing clear ICS
chains of command can streamline operations by
facilitating coordination and scheduling of
personnel, organising tasks, and identifying and
correcting operational bottlenecks. However, the
system can only work if trial personnel understand
the ICS architecture and the lines of authority
outlined in the ICS tree [23]. Clinicians may be
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unaccustomed to ICS systems and will have to be
educated in the basic principles
3. There is no such thing as too much planning.
During the early phase of this trial, pressure to get
the trial launched resulted in inadequate planning.
After trial launch, various operational gaps and
problems could only be identified only once SOPs
were put into practice. Consequently, planning was
an on-going and iterative process
4. Responsibility for regulatory administration of a
large trial should never rely on a single person.
Early in the PUPTH trial, regulatory compliance
and documentation was the responsibility of a single
person, as was common at this institution. The
processes involved were extremely complicated and
almost incomprehensible to the lead investigator and
planning committee. Therefore, it was extremely
difficult to detect errors until late in the trial timeline.
Subsequently, two additional expert staffers were
required to examine the mountains of regulatory
paperwork for due diligence, and correct mistakes and
omissions in previous regulatory submissions. In large
trials, additional expert team members may be required
to review, cross-check, and identify and eliminate errors
and omissions in a timely manner
5. Good communication is essential. The free flow
of information is essential to trial success. The
lead investigator and primary trial personnel must
establish an atmosphere where clear expectations
are identified, and personnel respect the time,
expertise and effort of other trial personnel.
Informal methods of communication, such as
phone calls, or email are important, but frequent
face-to-face meetings (with definable and action-
able goals) are key to maintaining strong working
relationships
6. Formally assess stakeholder relevance. A more
structured and early assessment of stakeholders
can improve identification and prioritisation of
group members, especially when criteria are
blurred. For example, in the PUPTH trial it was
assumed that EMS agency medical directors
could serve as EMS proxies, without the presence
of representatives from the agencies themselves.
However, the scope of medical director oversight
refers only to patient care activities and provider
practice [43]. As planning progressed, it became
clear that EMS representation was essential for
understanding specific agency capabilities and
limitations, identifying logistic bottlenecks, finding
acceptable compromises between trial demands
and normal work and resource requirements,
and gaining EMS provider commitment to the
research plan.
Unfortunately, funding for support personnel may be
limited. Clinician salary support can account for a
substantial portion of available funds, leaving insufficient
money for essential non-clinician support. Alternatively,
the terms of some grant awards may prohibit salary
support for certain staff, such as supernumerary
finance or regulatory officers, thus greatly reducing
operational capability. Early identification of essential
support personnel and hiring constraints is required
for adequate planning.
Conclusions
The diversity and scope of tasks and responsibilities
required for a large clinical trial are impossible for any
one person, or even a small team, to manage with skill.
Trial management is a distributed process; both broad
representation and coordination of key groups and
stakeholders are essential for efficient and successful trial
implementation. The ICS, commonly employed in
emergency management organisation, represents an
innovative approach to the management of complex large
clinical trials. Incorporation of ICS principles is an effect-
ive means of improving trial coordination and capability,
as it is flexible, structured, and highly reliable under
complex and unstable operational situations [23]. We
found that application of ICS to the management of this
specific clinical trial was instrumental in overcoming early
stage inertia and organisational confusion. ICS allowed
more rapid targeting of specific areas of trial dysfunction
and bottlenecks, and identification of appropriate
personnel required for problem solution, without over-
whelming the lead investigator and TC. Role flexibility
and role switching allowed nimble responses of the plan-
ning team and steering committee to situational changes.
However, implementation of ICS is not enough in
itself to guarantee trial success. Causes of trial failure
can originate at any or all organisational levels, either
through overall misdirection from the top, substandard
work at the implementation levels, or through omission
or insufficient attention to one or more critical compo-
nents of the trial. Efficient and successful implementa-
tion requires consideration of the clinical culture, and
the psychological and social factors operating outside of
ICS. Personnel unused to working within an ICS and
who sidestep organisational procedures constitute the
largest barrier to successful implementation.
Endnotes
1The HiPPO acronym (coined by web analytics guru
Avinash Kaushik) describes the tendency for decisions to
be made on the basis of ‘gut feelings’ or deference of
subordinate to more senior personnel.
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